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Abstract
In this paper we argue that the level of access to international
markets by firms is related not only to exogenous factors such as trade
costs, but also to endogenous factors such as strategic competition on
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low trade costs) makes trade easier for firms (given that R&D increases
the profitability of exports); (2) firms with a first-mover advantage in
R&D have higher competitiveness levels, and as a result they also have
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1 Introduction
Trade costs are at the cornerstone of most international economic analysis1.
This is the case for both theoretical and empirical models. In fact, trade costs
are fundamental to the ‘new’ trade theory (Krugman, 1980 and Brander,
1981), to the ‘new’ economic geography (Krugman, 1991 and Venables, 1996)
and to the theory on multinational firms (Horstman and Markusen, 1992 and
Brainard, 1997).
Not surprising then that trade costs also play an important role in the em-
pirical literature on international economics. First, there is a long tradition
of papers that estimates the magnitude of transportation costs in interna-
tional trade (Moneta, 1959; Waters, 1970; Finger and Yeats, 1976; Harrigan,
1993; Rauch, 1999 and Hummels 1999, 2001). Second, the most important
empirical model in international economics is the gravity model where trade
costs are quintessential (see the excellent review on trade costs and gravity
models by Anderson and Wincoop, 2004).
In addition, some stylized facts on international trade are explained by
making use of trade costs. For example, the exponential increase in the world
trade in the last century (Baier and Bergstrand, 2001), the “border puzzle”
and the observed “home bias” in consumption (Trefler, 1995 and Anderson
and Wincoop, 2003)2.
In this paper we do not deny the importance of trade costs in international
trade. However, we look at other factors besides trade costs that can aﬀect
the level of international market access by firms. In particular, following the
industrial organization literature on innovation started by Spence (1984), we
focus on the role of strategic interactions between firms that work through
investment in R&D.
With this purpose in mind we use a simple Cournot duopoly model with
three R&D scenarios. In the first case firms do not invest in R&D (bench-
mark). In the second case firms can invest in process R&D as in Leahy and
Neary (1997). In the third case, we extend the second case to allow for firms
to diﬀer in the capacity to commit to their R&D decisions. Following Bag-
well (1995), a firm is said to have R&D commitment power when the R&D
1We interpret trade costs in a broad way such that includes all impediments to trade
from transport costs, to tariﬀs, to non-tariﬀ barriers and so on.
2Accordingly, the “border puzzle” and the “home bias” in consumption relate with the
empirical fact that equally distant regions, trade more with each other if they are located
in the same country than if they are located in diﬀerent counties.
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choices have commitment value for the output stage, i.e.: when R&D is cho-
sen in a previous stage to outputs. Conversely, a firm does not have R&D
commitment power when the R&D choices have no commitment value to the
output stage, i.e.: when R&D and outputs are chosen simultaneously3.
Although having firms with diﬀerent levels of R&D commitment power
gives the R&D leader a first-mover advantage in the spirit of von Stackelberg
(1934), the consequences of having R&D leader advantages are much more
pervasive than of just having output leader advantages as in Stackelberg
(1934). This is so because given the strategic nature of R&D, commitment
power diﬀerences can also endogenize competitiveness asymmetries between
firms (i.e.: firms can end up with diﬀerent marginal costs). In a standard
Stackelberg model this is never possible, since firms are always symmetric in
terms of competitiveness independently of being a leader or a follower.
The endogenous competitiveness property of our model is particularly im-
portant because it allows us to show that firms can also aﬀect international
trade patterns by acting strategically against rivals. In fact, firms with higher
R&D commitment power over-invest in innovation not only to become more
competitive than rivals but also to reduce rivals’ involvement in export mar-
kets. As a result, firms with higher commitment power are also more active
in international markets (i.e.: they export more) than competitors with no
commitment power.
The result that some firms export more than others relies heavily on recog-
nizing the fact that firms are by nature heterogeneous. This is especially
crucial in international markets where competition is extremely fierce and
amongst a small number of very powerful oligopolist firms (Tybout, 2003).
In fact there is also strong empirical evidence that only the more competi-
tive firms are active in international markets (see for example Roberts and
Tybout, 1997 and Bernard et al., 2003). This empirical fact started a whole
new theoretical literature on heterogeneous firms. Melitz (2003) and Bernard
et al. (2003), for instance, noticed that only with heterogeneous firms is it
possible to have firms with diﬀerent levels of international market access.
However, in Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003) firm heterogeneity is
still exogenous, i.e.: firm competitiveness depends only on exogenous factors
such as trade costs and fixed costs at the firm level4. As a result, in Melitz
3In other words, the diﬀerence between the second and the third case above is that
in the former firms have symmetric levels of commitment power, while in the latter some
firms have more commitment power than others.
4Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003) generate firm heterogeneity by allocating
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(2003) and Bernard et al. (2003), asymmetries between firms cannot be ex-
plained and it is also impossible for firms to aﬀect rivals’ behavior in terms
of market access (i.e.: market access is exogenous to firms).
In this paper, however, by allowing firms to diﬀer in R&D commitment
power, we are able to endogenize competitiveness asymmetries between firms.
In our opinion, this result has some interesting consequences. First, we
present one reason for firm heterogeneity: R&D competition. Second, we
explain why firms can have diﬀerent levels of market access: asymmetries in
competitiveness. Third, we explain why the more competitive firms are more
active internationally: strategic competition.
In this sense we argue that although trade costs are central to interna-
tional trade, their role has probably been overstressed in the literature leaving
no room to look at other factors. In eﬀect, we will also show that, similarly
to trade costs, the rate of eﬃciency of R&D can also aﬀect firms’ access to
international markets: higher eﬃciency (like low trade costs) promotes trade,
while lower eﬃciency (like high trade costs) discourages trade. In addition,
the presence of R&D will always increase trade volumes relatively to the no
R&D case. In this way technological progress, similar to the one that we
have witnessed in the last century, can also have eﬀects on trade patterns
analogous to those usually attributed to trade costs alone.
2 Model
The world economy consists of two symmetric countries, home and foreign,
and two firms, the home and the foreign firm. Foreign variables are indicated
by an asterisk. The home and the foreign firm produce a homogenous good
to sell in their respective home market and to export. Since the model
is symmetric, in most of the following we concentrate our attention in the
home country. Equations for the foreign country (and for the foreign firm)
apply by symmetry.
The home and the foreign firm face the following indirect demand in the
home country:
P = a− b (q + x∗) (1)
where q is the domestic sales of the home firm and x∗ is the exports of the
productivity levels to firms randomly accordingly to some ex-ante statistical distribution.
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foreign firm to the home country (similar interpretation holds for q∗ and x).
Likewise, a and b stand respectively for the intercept of demand and for an
inverse measure of market size.
In turn profits by the home firm can be written as:
Π = (P − C) q + (P ∗ − C − t)x− Γ (2)
where t > 0 is a general measure of all barriers to trade with t = t∗, i.e.:
trade costs aﬀect the home and the foreign firm symmetrically. This is a
standard assumption in the literature, and in the context of our model it
means that the home and the foreign firm initially have the same level of
access to international markets. In turn C and Γ are the home firm’s marginal
and fixed costs respectively.
Like in Leahy and Neary (1997), we introduce R&D investment through
C and Γ. In particular we assume that the home and the foreign firm can
invest in process R&D that reduces marginal costs (C) but increases fixed
costs (Γ). For the home firm this amounts to:
C = (c− θk)
Γ = γ k2
2
+ f (3)
where k is R&D investment by the home firm, θ is the cost-reducing eﬀect of
R&D, γ is the cost of R&D, f is the exogenous fixed costs of production and
c is the initial marginal cost. The foreign firm has a similar cost structure
with c = c∗, f = f∗, θ = θ∗ and γ = γ∗. We assume that firms have sym-
metric technology parameters so that competitiveness asymmetries between
the home and the foreign firm can only arise endogenously.
At this point it is important to define a parameter η that is equal to:
η = θ
2
γb (4)
Like in Leahy and Neary (1997) η represents the “relative” return on
R&D. Accordingly, a high η stands for a large return on innovative activities,
since the cost-reducing eﬀect of R&D (θ) weighted by market size (1/b) is
large relatively to the cost of R&D (γ). The reverse holds for low η. In this
sense η can be interpreted as a metaphor for technological progress.
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2.1 Three R&D Games
We are interested in knowing how R&D and diﬀerences in R&D commitment
power aﬀect international trade. Following Bagwell (1995), a firm has R&D
commitment power when the R&D decisions have commitment value for the
output stage, i.e.: R&D levels are chosen in a previous stage to outputs.
The contrary happens when a firm has no commitment power: the firm sets
outputs and R&D levels simultaneously. Thus, when a firm has commitment
power, it can use R&D with two objectives: to improve its own productive
eﬃciency and also to aﬀect the rival strategic decisions. When a firm does
not have R&D commitment power, only the former holds.
We then compare three games that diﬀer in the nature of R&D competi-
tion and R&D commitment power. In the first game, firms cannot invest in
R&D (i.e.: θ = k = k∗ = 0) and therefore we call it the benchmark no R&D
game. In the second and third games firms can invest in R&D but these two
games diﬀer in the commitment power ability that firms have. Accordingly,
in the second game firms have symmetric R&D commitment power, while in
the third game the home and the foreign firm have asymmetric R&D com-
mitment power. In particular, in the third game we assume that only the
home firm has R&D commitment power.
Variables referring to each of these three games will be identified by the
following subscripts: B for the benchmark no R&D game, S for the symmet-
ric commitment power game and A for the asymmetric commitment power
game (see figure 1).
2.2 Timing of the Three Games
Figure 1 shows the timing of the three games introduced above. In the
benchmark no R&D game there is only one stage where the home and the
foreign firm make their output decisions simultaneously (qB, xB, q∗B and x
∗
B).
In the symmetric commitment power game, the home and the foreign
firm make their R&D decisions (kS and k∗S) in stage 1 and in stage 2 they
make their output decisions (qS, xS, q∗S and x
∗
S).
In the asymmetric commitment power game, the home firm chooses R&D
(kA) in stage 1, and in stage 2 the home firm chooses output levels (qA and
xA) while the foreign firm chooses both outputs (q∗A and x
∗
A) and R&D levels
(k∗A)
5.
5As defended by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), in order to justify the first-mover ad-
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         Game 
 
Stage 
Benchmark no-
R&D 
(B) 
Symmetric 
Commitment Power 
(S) 
Asymmetric 
Commitment Power 
(A) 
Stage 1  kS, kS* kA 
Stage 2 qB, xB, qB*, xB* qS, xS, qS*, xS* qA, xA, qA*, xA*, kA* 
 
Figure 1: Timing of the Games
In this sense the asymmetric commitment power game is a type of Stack-
elberg (1934) leader game, since the home firm has a first-mover advantage
in R&D. R&D commitment power therefore gives leader advantages to a firm
that competes with a firm that lacks such capability. As a result, and as will
be seen below, firms with diﬀerent commitment capabilities can become en-
dogenously asymmetric because their R&D choices internalize the diﬀerences
that they have at this level.
We are now ready to define the production equilibrium in the three games
considered in this paper.
3 Production and Entry
As usual the model is solved by backward induction. Accordingly, to compute
outputs we use the first order conditions (FOCs) for outputs to obtain:
q = D+t+2θk−θk
∗
3b
x = D−2t+2θk−θk
∗
3b
q∗ = D+t+2θk
∗−θk
3b
x∗ = D−2t+2θk
∗−θk
3b
(5)
whereD = (a− c) is a measure of a firm’s “initial cost competitiveness” (i.e.:
without R&D investment).
vantage in the context of our model it can be helpful to think of the home firm as an
incumbent that moves in R&D before the entrant foreign firm. However since the focus
of this paper is not the entry decision of the foreign firm we abstract from this issue here.
We are then implicitly assuming that the fixed costs are suﬃciently small so that they do
not promote exit. On incumbent-entrant models see Spence (1977).
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Note that by making k = k∗ = 0 in equation 5, we obtain the final
output expressions for the benchmark no R&D game. For the other two
games, however, we have to proceed to find the R&D expressions.
To compute R&D levels we use the FOCs for R&D. The FOCs for R&D
however depend on whether a firm has R&D commitment power or not. To
see this, note that the FOC for R&D for the home firm can be decomposed
into the following three terms:
dΠ
dk
= ∂Π∂k +
∂Π
∂q∗
dq∗
dk
+ ∂Π∂x∗
dx∗
dk
(6)
The first term on the right hand side of equation 6 is usually called the
non-strategic motive for R&D, while the second and third terms are the
strategic motives for R&D6. Accordingly, R&D is strategic when the second
and third terms are non-zero. This is the case if a firm chooses R&D in a
previous stage to outputs, i.e.: when a firm has R&D commitment power
(as for the home and the foreign firm in the symmetric commitment power
game and for the home firm in the asymmetric commitment power game).
Conversely, R&D is not strategic when the second and third terms are zero.
This is the case if a firm chooses R&D at the same time as outputs, i.e.:
when a firm has no R&D commitment power (like the foreign firm in the
asymmetric commitment power game).
Since the home firm always has commitment power, R&D levels by the
home firm are of the same nature under both the symmetric and the asym-
metric commitment power games:
ki =
4θ
3γ (qi + xi) with i = S or A
The foreign firm on the contrary only has R&D commitment power in the
symmetric commitment power game. In this case R&D levels by the foreign
firm equal:
k∗S =
4θ
3γ (q
∗
S + x
∗
S) (7)
In turn in the asymmetric commitment power game, R&D investment by
the foreign firm is:
6Note that the whole FOC for R&D for the home firms is: dΠdk =
∂Π
∂k +
∂Π
∂q
dq
dk +
∂Π
∂x
dx
dk +
∂Π
∂q∗
dq∗
dk +
∂Π
∂x∗
dx∗
dk . However, from the FOCs for outputs
∂Π
∂q =
∂Π
∂x = 0. As such these terms
cancel-out.
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k∗A =
θ
γ (q
∗
A + x
∗
A) (8)
Then in the symmetric commitment power game, since the home and
the foreign firm have symmetric R&D commitment power, they also have
symmetric incentives to invest in R&D. On the contrary, in the asymmetric
commitment power game, since the home and the foreign firm have asym-
metric commitment power levels, they now have asymmetric incentives to
invest in R&D.
The explicit output and R&D expressions for the two R&D games can
now be found by solving simultaneously for q, x, k, q∗, x∗ and k∗. Specifically
for the symmetric commitment power game we have:
qS = q
∗
S =
3D+t(3−4η)
b(9−8η)
xS = x
∗
S =
3D−2t(3−2η)
b(9−8η)
kS = k
∗
S =
4θ(2D−t)
bγ(9−8η) (9)
In turn, for the asymmetric commitment power game we obtain:
qA =
3D(1−2η)+t((3−11η)+8η2)
b(9−4η(7−4η))
xA =
3D(1−2η)−t((6−17η)+8η2)
b(9−4η(7−4η))
q∗A =
D(3−8η)+t((3−10η)+8η2)
b(9−4η(7−4η))
x∗A =
D(3−8η)−t(2(3−9η)+8η2)
b(9−4η(7−4η))
kA =
4θ(2D−t)(1−2η)
bγ(9−4η(7−4η))
k∗A =
θ(2D−t)(3−8η)
bγ(9−4η(7−4η)) (10)
Therefore, when firms are symmetric in commitment power they end up
being symmetric in every respect. However, when firms are asymmetric in
commitment power they become endogenously asymmetric, i.e.: the home
and the foreign firm end up producing and investing diﬀerently. In the next
sections we will analyze the consequences of this endogenous asymmetry on
international trade.
Proposition 1 In an international duopoly, diﬀerences in R&D commit-
ment power conduce to endogenous asymmetries between firms.
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4 Autarchy versus Trade
In this section we study the threshold level of trade costs between autarchy
and trade. We then define tˆ and tˆ∗ as the autarchy threshold level of trade
costs for the home and the foreign firm, respectively7.
In the benchmark no R&D case, tˆ and tˆ∗ can be found by solving xB and
x∗B for t at k = k
∗ = 0 in equation 5 to obtain:
tˆB = tˆ
∗
B <
1
2
D (11)
For the symmetric commitment power game, again we solve xS and x∗S
for t from equation 9 to get:
tˆS = tˆ
∗
S <
3D
2(3−2η) (12)
For the asymmetric commitment power game, we proceed in the same
way as before, by solving xA and x∗A for t from equation 10 to get:
tˆA <
3(1−2η)
6−η(17−8η)D
tˆ∗A <
1
2
(3−8η)
3−η(9−4η)D (13)
We then have that in the benchmark no R&D game and in the symmetric
commitment power game, the home and the foreign firm have symmetric
levels of access to international markets. This is so because in these two
games firms are always symmetric in competitiveness. The same, however,
does not occur in the asymmetric commitment power game. In this game,
as we have seen, due to diﬀerences in commitment power, the home and the
foreign firm can become endogenously asymmetric in competitiveness. This
implies that the home and the foreign firm also have diﬀerent levels of access
to international markets.
Proposition 2 In an international duopoly, diﬀerences in R&D commit-
ment power conduce to diﬀerent levels of access to international markets.
7The asterisk in tˆ∗ does not mean that the foreign firm faces diﬀerent trade costs from
the home firm. We continue to assume symmetry at the level of trade costs (i.e.: t = t∗).
However, we need to diﬀerentiate tˆ∗ from tˆ, since the autarchy threshold level of trade
costs can be diﬀerent for the home and the foreign firm.
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The next step is to analyze the relation between the diﬀerent autarchy
threshold levels of trade costs, tˆB, tˆS, tˆA and tˆ∗A. We are interested in knowing
under which game trade is easier for firms. As shown in appendix we have
that:
tˆA > tˆS > tˆB > tˆ
∗
A for η >
1
4
tˆA > tˆS > tˆ
∗
A > tˆB for η <
1
4
(14)
Then, two cases arise that depend on the return on R&D parameter
(η). For high return on R&D (η > 1
4
), trade is more easy for an R&D
leader (the home firm in the asymmetric commitment power game), and more
diﬃcult for an R&D follower (the foreign firm in the asymmetric commitment
power game). In second and third places in the market access ranking come
respectively a firm that faces a rival with symmetric R&D commitment power
(the home and the foreign firm in the symmetric commitment power game)
and a firm that does not invest in R&D (the home and the foreign firm in
the benchmark no R&D game).
If the return on R&D is instead relatively low (η < 1
4
), the first and
second positions in the market access ranking are not altered. However,
the firm with low commitment power (the foreign firm in the asymmetric
commitment power game) can start to have better market access than a firm
that does not invest in R&D (the home and the foreign firm in the benchmark
no R&D game).
Proposition 3 In an international duopoly, the firm that leads in commit-
ment power (i.e.: the more competitive firm) has better access to international
markets than the firm that lags behind in commitment power.
What this tells us is that market access depends not only on exogenous
factors, such as trade costs, but also on endogenous factors, such as strategic
competition in R&D. Accordingly, through R&D investment a firm can aﬀect
its own level of international market access but also that of competitors,
because innovation aﬀects the competitiveness balance in the market.
In what follows we will only consider the parameter space that assures
that trade is possible under the three games. As can be seen from equations
11 to 14 this is the case if:
11
0 < t < 1
2
D
0 < η < 3
8
(15)
5 R&D and Trade
In this section we intend to show that, similar to trade costs, R&D investment
also has an important role to play in international trade patterns. First, R&D
can have the same type of eﬀects as trade costs on market access: higher eﬃ-
ciency of R&D, like low trade costs, increases trade (and vice-versa). Second,
R&D competition introduces some new dimensions previously disregarded in
the trade literature: such as market access being endogenous to firms’ strate-
gic decisions.
To study the eﬀects of R&D on international trade we compute the deriv-
atives of tˆ, tˆ∗, x and x∗, in relation to η. For the symmetric commitment
power game we have (see appendix):
dtˆS
dη > 0 and
dxS
dη > 0 (16)
In turn, for the asymmetric commitment power game the relation is the
following (see appendix):
d(tˆA)
dη > 0 and
d(xA)
dη > 0
d(tˆ∗A)
dη > 0 and
d(x∗A)
dη > 0 for 0 < η <
3−
√
3
8
d(tˆ∗A)
dη < 0 and
d(x∗A)
dη < 0 for
3−
√
3
8
< η < 3
8
(17)
Then, when firms are symmetric in commitment power, higher return on
R&D (high η) makes trade easier for both the home and the foreign firm.
When the home and the foreign firm are asymmetric in commitment
power, however, only the R&D leader (the home firm) benefits when η in-
creases. For the R&D follower (the foreign firm) this does not hold com-
pletely: the foreign firm’s access to export markets only increases with η if
R&D is not too eﬃcient; when R&D is very eﬃcient, however, foreign firm’s
access to international markets deteriorates.
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The rational for this result is that when the return on R&D is very high,
the home firm can use the first-mover advantage in R&D more eﬀectively to
export more and to force the foreign firm to export less.
Proposition 4 In an international oligopoly, market access by the firm with
higher commitment power always increases with the return on R&D. This is
not the case for the firm with lower commitment power when the return on
R&D is high.
So far we have just showed the first part of our argument: that other fac-
tors besides trade costs can also aﬀect firms’ access to international markets,
specifically R&D. We proceed now to the second part of our argument that
market access can be endogenous to firms’ strategic decisions.
To show this we first analyze the implications of the endogenous compet-
itiveness asymmetry property of the asymmetric commitment power game.
We have said previously that in the asymmetric commitment power game,
firms become endogenously asymmetric due to diﬀerent levels of R&D com-
mitment power. In eﬀect, in spite of the fact that the home and the foreign
firm are initially exactly symmetric in terms of technology, they end up pro-
ducing and investing in R&D diﬀerently. It is therefore important to know
how much the asymmetry between the home and the foreign firm amounts
to. To study this, note that the following relations hold (see appendix):
kA > k
∗
A
qA + xA > q
∗
A + x
∗
A
xA > x
∗
A
xA > q
∗
A (18)
Then, the firm with higher R&D commitment power (home firm) is more
eﬃcient (i.e.: invests more in R&D), is bigger in size (i.e.: produces more)
and is more active internationally (i.e.: exports more). In fact, the compet-
itiveness level of the home firm is so high that it even allows it to sell more
in the foreign country than the foreign firm itself.
Proposition 5 In an international duopoly, the firm with higher R&D com-
mitment power exports more because it is more competitive and bigger in
size.
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Since market access is then endogenous to firms’ strategic choices and
competitive environment, this also aﬀects trade volumes under the three
games. In particular we observe the following relation (see proof in appen-
dix):
XS > XA > XB (19)
with XS = xS + x∗S, XA = xA + x
∗
A and XB = xB + x
∗
B. Therefore,
trade volumes are higher when firms invest in R&D and are symmetric in
R&D commitment power. In turn, trade volumes are lower when firms do
not invest in R&D. In the middle of the trade volumes rank is the scenario
where firms invest in R&D and are asymmetric in R&D commitment power.
Note that XS > XA, because as we have seen in the previous section, the
no commitment power firm has always worst market access than a firm with
commitment power.
In this sense symmetry in competitiveness levels (symmetric commitment
power game) encourages more trade than when firms are asymmetric in com-
petitiveness (asymmetric commitment power game). In any case the possi-
bility of investing in R&D increases trade volumes relatively to cases where
there is no R&D investment.
Proposition 6 In an international duopoly, the volume of trade is always
higher when firms can invest in R&D.
We therefore believe that R&D competition can help to explain two styl-
ized facts on international trade patterns: first, the increase in the world
trade in the last century; and second, asymmetries in international trade
patterns, i.e.: only the more competitive firms export.
Accordingly, we can explain the increase in the world trade not only as a
result of a reduction in trade costs but also as a direct consequence of techno-
logical progress. The rational for this is that higher R&D eﬃciency facilitates
access to international markets. Also, we can explain asymmetries in interna-
tional trade patterns as the outcome of strategic interactions between firms.
The intuition behind this is that strategic competition in R&D allows lead-
ing technological firms to have better access to international markets and to
deter lagging technological firms from international activity.
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6 Discussion
In this paper, we have argued that firms’ exporting behavior is not only
related with exogenous factors such as trade costs, but also with endogenous
factors such as technological competition. According to this view, firms can
also aﬀect their market access by acting strategically against rivals.
In order to analyze this issue we have compared three models that diﬀered
in terms of technological competition dynamics. In the first case considered
firms were not allowed to invest in R&D, in the second firms had symmetric
R&D capacities, and in the third we introduced an R&D leader-follower set-
up.
From the comparison of the three R&D scenarios, we found that trade
volumes are always higher when firms can invest in R&D. Furthermore tech-
nological progress (i.e.: higher eﬃciency of R&D) promotes trade, similarly
to what happens with low transport costs. In this sense, R&D competition,
and not only trade costs, can also explain the increase in world trade in the
last century.
In turn, the asymmetric commitment power R&D case proved to be par-
ticularly interesting since it allowed us to endogenize firms’ competitiveness.
In particular, we have showed that the firm with higher R&D commitment
power becomes endogenously more competitive than the firm with no com-
mitment power. As a consequence, firms with higher commitment power also
have better access to export markets. Furthermore, the only case where a
firm does not benefit from technological progress is when the firm is a technol-
ogy follower. For these firms, very high R&D eﬃciency can reduce exports.
Technological competition can therefore exclude firms with low R&D capac-
ity from international trade. This result can help to explain some of the
empirical facts at the base of the firm heterogeneity literature (see Roberts
and Tybout, 1997 and Bernard et al., 2003); in particular the fact that firms
involved in international trade are usually larger in size and more competitive
than purely domestic firms.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3 (Relation between tˆ in the Three Games)
tˆA − tˆS = 3ηD2(6−η(17−8η))(3−2η) > 0
tˆS − tˆB = ηD3−2η > 0
tˆB − tˆ∗A =
−Dη(1−4η)
2(3−η(9−4η))
It can be easily seen that tˆB > tˆ∗A if η >
1
4
and the reverse for η < 1
4
.
Proof of Proposition 4 (Influence of η in tˆ, x and x∗) For the sym-
metric commitment power game we have:
dtˆS
dη =
3D
(3−2η)2 > 0
dxS
dη =
12(2D−t)
b(9−8η)2 > 0
And for the asymmetric commitment power game we have:
d(tˆA)
dη =
3D(5−16η(1−η))
(6−η(17−8η))2 > 0
d(xA)
dη =
3(2D−t)(5−16η(1−η))
b(9−4η(7−4η))2 > 0
d(tˆ∗A)
dη =
D(3−8η(3−4η))
2(3−η(9−4η))2
d(x∗A)
dη =
2(2D−t)(3−η(24−32η))
b(9−4η(7−4η))2
Summing up:
d(tˆA)
dη and
d(xA)
dη are positive as long as 0 < η <
3
8
. Instead,
d(tˆ∗A)
dη and
d(x∗A)
dη are positive for 0 < η <
3−
√
3
8
but negative for 3−
√
3
8
< η < 3
8
.
Proof of Proposition 5 (Commitment versus No Commitment Power)
kA − k∗A =
θ(2D−t)
bγ(9−4η(7−4η)) > 0
(qA + xA)− (q∗A + x∗A) =
2θ2(2D−t)
b2γ(9−4η(7−4η)) > 0
xA − x∗A =
θ2(2D−t)
γb2(9−4η(7−4η)) > 0
xA − q∗A =
2η(D−8tη)+9t(3η−1)
b(9−4η(7−4η)) > 0
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Proof of Proposition 6 (Trade Volumes under the Three Games)
XB = xB + x
∗
B =
2(D−2t)
3b
XS = xS + x
∗
S = 2
3D−2t(3−2η)
b(9−8η)
XA = xA + x
∗
A =
2D(3−7η)−t(12−η(35−16η))
b(9−4η(7−4η))
Then it follows:
XS −XA = η(3−8η)(2D−t)b(9−4η(7−4η))(9−8η) > 0
XA −XB = η(7−16η)(2D−t)3b(9−4η(7−4η)) > 0
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